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In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. 
I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus 
over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, as the opportunity cost of fixed 
factors. I start by arguing that the distinction between fixed and variable factors is not 
the key for the definition of rent; ultimately, it is monopoly. Varian’s conception of rent 
is, essentially, Ricardo’s: rent is extraordinary profit turned rent. On the basis of a self-
inconsistent notion of opportunity cost, Varian introduces the idea that rent is the 
opportunity cost of land, when what he actually defines is the opportunity cost of not 
renting the land. I also critically examine the related notion of “producer’s surplus”, and 
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Introduction 
There are, at least, two contrary conceptions of rent in standard 
Microeconomics, which, in this paper, I examine as they appear in Varian’s 
intermediate textbook on Microeconomics. The contradiction between the two notions 
of rent is of the same kind as that between the two standard definitions of profit as cost 
and as surplus over cost; likewise, profit is sometimes defined as a cost and some other 
times as a surplus over cost. The analysis of the contradictory definitions of rent 
logically leads to the question as to the distinction between rent and profit, a question 
which, once again, receives contradictory answers from standard Microeconomic 
Theory: sometimes rent is different from profit but some other times rent and profit are 
given the same definition. To put it briefly: the question is whether profit is the rent of 
capital or a payment to capital which is not of the nature of rent. 
The definition of the rent of land (in general, of the fixed factors) as the 
opportunity cost of land or of the fixed factors obeys to the same defensive strategy as 
the definition of profit as the opportunity cost of capital. In both cases, we find the 
same self-contradictory conception of opportunity cost according to which the return to 
a factor is determined by its uniform competitive market price. This conception of 
opportunity cost is self-contradictory because it explains the competitive price of land 
(of capital) n the basis that land (and capital) already have a competitive price: it is, 
thus, a “petitio principii”. Without an already formed competitive price of land (of 
capital) it is impossible to define the opportunity cost of a particular rental of land (or 
of a particular capital investment). To say that the opportunity cost of a factor is its 
uniform market price is a self-contradiction, because the factor is not ceasing to earn 
what it is earning. 
Varian begins by defining the rent of land in relation to the notion of fixed 
factor. According to this idea, rent is the return to fixed factors in so far as they are 
fixed. However, as the argument unfolds, the tie disappears and two important ideas 
become clear: first, that the notion of fixed factor is void because fixity in supply is 
defined in a tautological way; secondly, that “fixity”, being nothing, is irrelevant to 
define rent. The difficulty can best be seen in the contradiction between fixity and 
competition: to the extent that factors are fixed there is no room for competitive 
adjustment and, thereby, for competitive equilibrium. Hence the self-contradictory   3
notion of “short-run competitive equilibrium”, where the “short-run” is defined as 
presence of fixed, that is, non-adjustable factors, which logically precludes competitive 
equilibrium, as competitive equilibrium demands all the contrary, namely, mobility. 
It is to be noted that if rent is defined as the opportunity cost of land, it is 
irrelevant whether land is fixed or variable in supply, just as capital has an opportunity 
cost despite not being fixed in supply; indeed, the question as to whether capital is or 
not fixed in supply is not even mentioned in the presentation of the theory of profit and 
arises only in the course of the development of the theory of rent. 
In chapter 22, Varian deals with the rent of land and fixed factors. In 
contradiction to chapter 18, where he presents the rent of land as an instance of 
opportunity cost, he says now that the rent of land is the surplus over cost that accrues 
to the owner of land. Obviously, if the rent of land is a surplus over cost, it is not a cost 
itself. The conception of the rent of land as surplus over cost implies that it is a surplus 
over all the costs, among which the opportunity cost of land must have already been 
included; otherwise, we could not say “all the costs”. This implies that the rent of land 
is a surplus over total cost and, therefore, a surplus over the opportunity cost of land (if 
there were any), and, therefore, a contradiction with chapter 18. 
The contradiction can be seen from another standpoint in Varian’s conceptions 
of the income of fixed factors. Some times, the income of fixed factors is said to be 
fixed cost, that is, cost; some other times, on the contrary, it is said to be “rent”, or more 
exactly, “pure economic rent”, that is, surplus over cost which is not itself any kind of 
cost. 
In chapter 22 things get somewhat more confused, as Varian gives a third 
definition of the rent of land which, on a closer look, is but a contradictory 
juxtaposition of the previous two contradictory notions provided before. He says that 
the income of a variable factor is equal to its opportunity cost, whereas the income of a 
fixed factor is equal to its opportunity cost plus economic rent. According to this 
composition of the two contradictory views, the rent of land has two parts of a 
contradictory nature: first, the opportunity cost of land; secondly, the surplus over this 
cost (and over all the other costs). 
1.Analysis of Texts   4
Let us analyze the relevant passages of chapter 22. Varian writes: 
“If there is free entry, profits are driven to zero in the long run. But not every industry has free 
entry (KMO: In the long-run). In some industries the number of firms in the industry is fixed. A common 
reason for this is that there are some factors of production that are available in fixed supply. We said that 
in the long run the fixed factors could be bought or sold by an individual firm. But there are some factors 
that are fixed for the economy as a whole even in the long run.” (Varian, 1993, 388). 
Thus, if, in the long-run, there are factors that, for the economy as a whole, are 
fixed, it follows that, even in the long run, free entry will not be possible and, therefore, 
that profits will not be driven to zero. If there are factors that are fixed in supply for the 
economy as a whole, the process of entry of capital which makes supply so abundant as 
to close the gap between selling-price and cost-price stops before this happens. This 
implies that for free-entry to reach the point of zero profit, the supply of factors has to 
be non-fixed, that is, infinitely elastic. Let us leave this implication aside for the 
moment; the problem is: the surplus of revenues over costs that remains because of the 
presence of fixed factors that prevent free entry is profit or rent? To analyze Varian’s 
contradictory answers to this question, we have to bear in mind the following 
observations. 
The long-run, as opposed to the short run, is defined on the basis of the 
absence of fixed factors. Therefore, if, as Varian says, “there are some factors that are 
fixed for the economy as a whole even in the long run”, the implication is that the long-
run competitive equilibrium is impossible because some factors will ever remain fixed. 
If there are fixed factors in the long-run and if the notion of a long-run competitive 
equilibrium requires all factors to be variable, it follows that there can be competitive 
equilibrium in the short-run only: the very notion of a “long-run competitive 
equilibrium with fixed factors” would be a contradiction in terms. Varian is not aware 
of this conflict and, in the course of his book makes contradictory statements: here he 
writes that there can be fixed factors in the long-run but, in other places, he writes that, 
in the long-run, all costs become variable, which implies that, in the long-run, there are 
not fixed factors. 
Notwithstanding this logical problem in the conception of the competitive 
equilibrium, which deserves separate treatment, it is clear that Varian formulates the 
theory of rent in the context of competition. He is following in the footsteps of Ricardo, 
for whom the rent of land must be explained as an outcome of competition and arises   5
only as far as capitals are allowed to freely compete. As Ricardo sees it, however, the 
rent of land arises as the competition of capitals cannot overcome the monopoly of the 
private property of land. This also is Varian’s idea, though his system has a problem to 
make room for the framework he needs to restate Ricardo. 
Land is a fixed factor because the supply of land does not change with the 
price of land; the reason is that the supply of land, the extension of the Earth’s surface 
cannot be increased by offering money to land (if that made any sense). But this is not 
the only cause of the lack of elasticity in the supply of a factor: 
“There are other cases where the fixed factor is fixed not by nature, but by law. The taxicab 
industry in many cities is regulated in this way. (…) If there are restrictions such as the above on the 
number of firms in the industry, so that firms cannot enter the industry freely, it may appear that it is 
possible to have an industry with positive profits in the long run, with no economic forces to drive those 
profits to zero.” (Varian, 1993, 389) 
The “economic force” that drives profits to zero is, actually, competition. The 
term “profit” in this text means “surplus of selling-price over cost-price”, so the lack of 
competition due to the limitations to entry fails to close the gap between selling-price 
ands cost-price. It seems, therefore, that the limitation of the supply of a factor, be it by 
law or by nature, prevents competition from annihilating profit. 
The text provides a new hint on the origin of rent. The cause of rent is not 
exactly that the supply of land or of taxicab licenses is not perfectly elastic, but 
monopoly. The reason why rent arises is that the property of land or of taxicab licenses 
is not determined by free competition, but that free competition has to accept these 
property rights as given. In this sense, the property of land or of taxicab licenses is a 
monopoly power that clashes against the free movement of capital. This would mean 
that rent is a kind of monopoly profit, which as Varian acknowledges in the chapter on 
monopoly, involves a transfer from the buyer to the seller and, therefore, a 
corresponding loss (even a deadweight loss for the economy as a whole). 
Varian said above that the existence of fixed factors for the economy as a 
whole made impossible free entry even in the long run. This seems to imply that, even 
in the long run, not all profits are driven to zero; the profits of the industries that use 
factors fixed in supply, by nature or by law, will not be driven down to zero. Is this the 
case? Varian answers:   6
“This appearance is wrong. There is an economic force that pushes profits to zero. If a firm is 
operating at a point where its profits appear to be positive in the long run, it is probably because we are 
not appropriately measuring the market value of whatever it is that is preventing entry.” (Varian, 1993, 
389). 
The seeming profit is, actually, the “market value” of the fixed factor, that is, 
the rent of the fixed factor. Profit has been annihilated, even if competition does not 
fully prevail. The surplus of selling-price over cost-price that looks like profit is not 
actually such, but the rent of the fixed factor that is preventing full entry. Because of 
the presence of fixed factors that hinders free-entry, selling-price remains above cost-
price, but the surplus of the former over the latter is not profit, but rent; in this case, rent 
of the taxicab licenses. 
The question arises immediately, Does the rent of the fixed factor represent a 
monopoly profit? This seems to be the obvious consequence, but Varian does not want 
to admit it and, to avoid it, he maneuvers to turn monopoly profit into a cost by 
appealing to a self-inconsistent notion of opportunity cost: 
“Here it is important to remember the economic definition of costs: we should value each 
factor of production at its market price –its opportunity cost. If it appears that a farmer is making positive 
profits after we have subtracted his costs of production, it is probably because we have forgotten to 
subtract the cost of his land.” (Varian, 1993, 389). 
This text adds confusion by attributing two different roles, capitalist (farmer) 
and landlord, to the same physical person. It is true that a landlord may also be a 
farmer, but when the question at issue is the distinction between profit and rent, the 
obvious way is to separate the property of capital from that of land. The income of the 
landowner is not the profit of the agricultural firm nor the reverse: moreover, rent has 
been presented as a deduction from the profit of the firm, that is, as a cost for the firm. 
Now Varian speaks of the rent of the landowner as if it were the same as the profit of 
the capital invested on the land that the landowner owns, which is yet another 
confusion, and writes: 
“Suppose we manage to value all the inputs to farming except for the land cost, and end up 
with π  dollars per year of profits.” (Varian, 1993, 389). 
This text is utterly misleading. If we follow the example of the taxicab 
licenses, the π  dollars of surplus of revenues over costs do not represent profit, but   7
rent. Competition drives profit down to zero, so the surplus of revenues over costs that 
remains is rent. If we add to this the idea that the rent of land is the “cost of land” 
because it is the opportunity cost of land, it follows that the “land cost” is π . 
“How much would the land be worth in a free market? How much would someone pay to rent 
that land for a year? The answer is: they would be willing to rent it for π  dollars per year, the “profits” 
that it brings in. You wouldn’t even have to know anything about farming to rent this land and earn π  
dollars.” (Varian, 1993, 389). 
But if you are in your senses, you would never undertake such a silly 
business.“π  dollars per year” is not the profit, but the rent “that lands brings in”. That 
Varian himself stresses the word “profits” suggests that he is somehow aware that he 
should write “rent” and not “profit”. Note the paradox: land has a “competitive price” 
to the extent that it is fixed in supply, which implies that the market for land cannot be 
competitive. Actually, there is competition among the farmer capitalists to get the 
permission to cultivate the land and, thus, make a profit for capital. This basic feature is 
obscured by Varian’s anti-Ricardian view that competition kills profit. If competition 
kills profit, it is senseless to undertake any capital investment and, even more, to pay a 
rent, as there would be no profit from which rent could be deducted. In Ricardo, 
competition equalizes the profit rate; the farmer is willing to cede some part of his 
profit as rent to the landlord because, in the end, he makes profit at the same rate as any 
other capital investment. 
As a consequence of his rejection of the Ricardian conception of competition, 
Varian adds nonsense to confusion. He says: anyone would be willing to pay π  as rent 
because by paying π  he purchases the right to be paid π . Right, but where is the point 
of such a business? You pay $10 to have the right to be paid $10. Ricardo would have 
said: the farmer is willing to pay $10 to the landlord as rent because he will make more 
than $10 from the sale of the produce of land. Indeed, he will make profit at the average 
rate, as what accrues to the landlord as rent is the excess profit over the uniform 
competitive profit rate. The “market  value” of land is $10 in the sense that the rent that 
that land yields, the extraordinary profit that the property of land enables to pocket is 
$10. 
What Varian means to say, once corrected from Ricardo, is that you pay rent 
in order to get the right to be paid profits; that is to say: you have some capital, but do   8
not own the land which you need for your business. Since without land your capital 
would remain idle, it pays to rent a piece of land and set your capital to work. You will 
have to make a deduction from your revenues in order to pay rent to your landlord, but 
once you have paid this cost (and all the other costs) you get your profit. If this profit is 
the same as you could do in any other business, then it pays to rent the land. Your 
landlord pockets an income on the basis of his monopoly power, but you pocket your 
profit at the current market rate. Of course, rent is a cost for you, a deduction from the 
profit of your capital, but you still make a profit, and at the same rate as you would 
anywhere else. 
“The examples in the last section are instances of economic rent. Economic rent is defined as 
those payments to a factor of production that are in excess of the minimum payment necessary to have 
that factor supplied.” (Varian 1993, 390). 
What is “the minimum payment necessary to have a factor supplied”? Varian 
answered this question when treating of profit: the opportunity cost, that is, the 
competitive market price of the factor. Accordingly, the “minimum payment to have a 
factor supplied” is that payment which just covers opportunity cost. It follows that 
economic rent is the payment to a factor in excess of opportunity cost: therefore, 
economic rent does not represent any cost, but all the contrary, a surplus over cost 
which is not any cost itself. To put it briefly, if rent is economic rent and, if economic 
rent is surplus payment over opportunity cost, it follows that rent is payment not 
according to, but in excess of the opportunity cost of the fixed factor. 
According to Varian’s self-inconsistent conception of opportunity cost, the 
opportunity cost of a factor is the competitive and, therefore, uniform price of the 
factor. In the case of capital, the “market value” of capital, which is its opportunity cost, 
is the competitive or average profit, that profit which competition is supposed to kill. 
This leads to a paradox in the notion of fixed factor, to show which we can follow 
Varian: 
“Consider, for example, the case of oil discussed earlier. In order to produce oil you need some 
labor, some machinery, and, most importantly, some oil in the ground! Suppose that it costs $1 a barrel to 
pump oil out of the ground from an existing well. Then any price in excess of $1 a barrel will induce 
firms to supply oil from existing wells. But the actual price of oil is much higher than $1 a barrel. People 
want oil for various reasons, and they are willing to pay more than its cost of production to get it. The 
excess of the price of oil over its cost of production is economic rent.” (Varian, 1993, 390)   9
This sounds odd: the excess of the price of oil over its cost of production is 
profit, isn’t it? Indeed, this is the definition of profit that Varian supplies in chapter 18 
when he explains that the goal of the firm is the maximization of profit, not of 
economic rent: 
“Profits are defined as revenues minus costs. Suppose that the firm produces n outputs 
(y1,...,yn) and uses m inputs (x1,…,xn). Let the prices of the output goods be (p1,…,pn) and the prices of the 
inputs be (w1,…,wn). The profits the firm receives, π , can be expressed as  “ 












The definition of profit is exactly the same as that of economic rent! 
From what we have seen so far, we can summarize the basics of Varian’s 
conceptual framework. A surplus of selling-price over cost-price, that is, of revenues 
over costs, means an economic rent. Economic rent is, in principle, value in excess over 
production cost. But, at the same time, the only way in which revenues can be greater 
than costs is by monopoly power, so, in the end, monopoly rent, economic rent, pure 
economic rent or rent simply are different names for the same concept, namely, value 
that appears as surplus value to the part that has monopoly power but as a loss to the 
rest of the economy. 
The term “economic profit” is equivocal in this context, as it is the opposite to 
“accounting profit”; “economic profit” is, thus, another name for “competitive” or 
“normal profit”. As we saw, competition kills this competitive-normal-economic profit, 
so the only profit that can exist under competition is …rent. 
Since the income of capital profit, consists in the excess of revenues over 
costs, it follows that profit is the rent of capital. But a factor can get a rent only in so far 
as the supply of it is inelastic. The greater the lack of elasticity in supply, the higher 
thee rent; the extreme case would be total fixity in supply, the case of land. If the 
supply of a factor is perfectly elastic, it gets no surplus value, no return; thus, if the 
supply of capital were perfectly elastic, capital would not earn any profit. In fact, 
however, this is what happens under competition. 
The entire income of the “factor” “land” consists in rent because the supply of 
land is perfectly fixed. If the supply is not totally inelastic, the income of the factor has   10
two parts: one, the competitive gain and, secondly, the extraordinary gain, rent. But, 
under competition, competitive gain must be zero. It follows that the only gain or return 
or income or payment that a factor (that is, a capital investment) can earn is 
extraordinary, that is, monopoly gain or economic rent or rent simply. To add more 
confusion to this pile of contradictions, Varian smuggles in an inconsistent notion of 
opportunity cost and tells the reader that rent is an opportunity cost because, if you have 
the property of some land and do not rent it, you forgo the corresponding rent; 
therefore, in a final fallacy, the rent you earn if you rent your land is the opportunity 
cost of your land. 
At the root of this conceptual disaster lies a defective understanding of the 
notions of surplus value and competition. Varian is unable to make any sense of the 
notion of competitive profit, which appears to be a contradiction in terms but is 
fundamental to understand capitalism. 
“From the viewpoint of the economy as a whole, it is the price of agricultural products that 
determines the value of agricultural land. But from the viewpoint of the individual farmer, the value of 
his land is a cost of production that enters into the pricing of his product.” (Varian, 1993, 390) 
This is a paraphrase of Ricardo: 
“Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn is high.” (Ricardo, 
1821, 74-5) 
Varian is saying that Ricardo is right “from the viewpoint of the economy as a 
whole”, but wrong “from the viewpoint of the individual farmer”. In other words, 
Ricardo is right to say that price determines rent “from the viewpoint of the economy as 
a whole”, but, wrong to imply that this would be so when looked at “from the 
viewpoint of the individual farmer”, as in this case the right view is that rent determines 
price. 
“From the viewpoint of the economy as a whole”, the price of agricultural 
products determines the rent of land in the sense that it determines the surplus of the 
price of agricultural products over their production cost. However, in what sense does 
this surplus constitute a cost of production for the farmer? (actually, Varian’s “farmer” 
is the landlord) Varian answers that this surplus must be a cost in the end because every 
income involves a cost when looked at from the “viewpoint” of the payer. What Varian  
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is actually doing is to 
put together his two 
contrary notions of 
rent disguising the 
contradiction under 
the cloak of a 
difference in 
viewpoint. 
If the rent of 
land is the surplus 
over cost accruing to the landowner, rent could be said to be a cost of production for 
the farmer, and not for the landowner, to the extent that the rent of the landowner 
requires a deduction from the profit that the farmer would otherwise make. The farmer 
can pay a rent just to the extent that he parts with some of his profits. He is willing to 
cede such a part of his profit to the landowner because with it he wins the race over the 
other farmers who are looking for a profitable investment for their capital. Note, 
however, and this is the point, that such cession does not involve any advance of capital 
form the farmer to the landlord. By paying rent, the farmer is transferring to the 
landlord the extra profit over the uniform competitive profit that he would make were 
not land the subject of private property and scarce. Such cession does not represent any 
cost of production in the sense that it doe not involve any advance of capital. The 
reason why Varian introduces the view that rent is a cost right after having defined it as 
a surplus over cost is the erroneous principle that income, cost and flow of money are 
equivalent notions  
Varian depicts a graph in order to illustrate his idea: 
 
And comments: 
“rent=p*y*-cv(y*). This is precisely what we referred to as producer’s surplus earlier. Indeed, 
it is the same concept, simply viewed in a different light. Thus we can also measure rent by taking the 
area to the left of the marginal cost curve, as we saw earlier. Given the definition of rent in equation 
(22.1), it is now easy to see the truth of what we said earlier: it is the equilibrium price that determines 
rent, not the reverse. The firm supplies along its marginal cost curve –which is independent of the 
expenditures on the fixed factors. The rent will adjust to drive profits to zero.” (Varian, 1993, 391).   12
That “equilibrium price” determines rent is the view of Ricardo, namely, that 
competitive price determines rent. Note, by the way, that Varian does not make now 
any qualification as to the point of view. The message of the graph is that rent is the 
surplus of the value of output over variable cost; in other words, that rent is fixed cost. 
On the anti-Ricardian premise that the only competitive profit rate of equilibrium is 
zero, the average total cost curve is taken to be the same as the total average revenue 
curve. The excess of the latter over variable average cost, depicted in a separate curve, 
it said to be rent. Since every payment involves the corresponding cost and factor, it 
follows that the surplus of revenues over variable costs is the price of the “services” of 
land, the permission of the landlord to use his land. 
It is interesting to note the similarity between this graph and those where 
Varian represents profit for the single competitive producer and monopoly profit. In all 
of them, there is a surplus of revenues over costs. In this case, the surplus of revenues 
over costs is said to be fixed cost because the cost function includes variable costs only. 
As I explained above, however, what the graph is saying is that only the factor fixed in 
supply gets a return, that the competitive return of the factors the supply of which is 
perfectly elastic and, therefore, properly “variable”, is zero. Remember that, in the 
long-run, all factors are “variable”; which means that, in the long-run, surplus value in 
general, be it under the form of profit or of rent, is zero. 
In Ricardo, rent adjusts to drive to zero not profit in general, but only 
extraordinary or monopoly profit. As the competitive profit rate of equilibrium will in 
general be different from zero, Ricardo would not say that rent is the difference 
between Average Cost and Average Variable Cost, but between normal and 
extraordinary profit, that is, between average revenue and average cost (leaving aside 
Varian’s misleading distinction fixed-variable). The result of the transformation of 
extraordinary profit into rent is that the profit rate for any capital investment is the 
same: we get a uniform, and positive normal or competitive profit. 
Ricardo, unlike Varian, does not reject the notions of surplus value and 
competitive profit; all the contrary, he builds his whole system upon them. Varian, on 
the contrary, rejects these fundamental notions and ends saying that rent adjusts to drive 
profit in general to zero, that is, so as to annihilate profit altogether, which amounts to 
the annihilation of the capitalist system. As Varian sees it, competition kills profit   13
because it does away with surplus value in general. When competition does not fully 
prevail, there is an appearance of surplus value, but, as soon as competition is given 
free rein, it becomes clear that the seeming surplus value was, actually, a transfer of 
value from some agents to others. In other words, that the seeming profit was, actually, 
monopoly profit; thus, no profit at all can exist under perfect competition: all that can 
exist is exchange value, but not surplus exchange value. Capitalism and barter are, 
ultimately, the same economic system. 
Let me stress again the fundamental difference between Ricardo and Varian. 
According to Ricardo, competition does not annihilate profit, does not close the gap 
between selling-price and cost-price; it rather equalizes the profit rate for any capital 
investment. In Varian, competition and profit are opposite notions, because competition 
is understood to annihilate the commercial margin and, thus, profit. For Varian, unlike 
for Ricardo, competition equalizes the profit rate at the zero level. 
Varian could have said that the surplus of the selling-price of taxicab rides 
over cost-price is “accounting profit”, but that, if we take into account the opportunity 
cost of the capital invested in the taxicab industry, we would see that “economic 
(competitive) profit” is zero. According to this idea, the surplus of selling-price of cost-
price would be a mistaking appearance: if we correctly computed all the costs, there 
would be no surplus of revenues over costs. 
However, noticing the presence of a factor fixed in supply, or rather, the 
presence of monopoly, Varian attributes the surplus of selling-price over cost-price 
(which is thus admitted to be real) to the monopoly property over the factor, to the 
power to issue licenses to the best interest of the issuer. Now, Varian says that the 
surplus of selling-price over cost-price is the rent of the monopolist seller of licenses. 
This is Ricardo’s theory of rent, according to which rent is the share in extraordinary 
profit of the landlord class in virtue of their monopoly power over land. But then 
Varian returns to the self-inconsistent notion of notion of opportunity cost that he had 
already appealed to in order to defend that profit is not any surplus and says that rent is 
the opportunity cost of the fixed factor. 
This is a Microeconomic version of the standard Macroeconomic error that 
income and cost are correlative rather than opposite notions. To save the rent-earners 
from the accusation of expropriation, Varian parts company with Ricardo and says that   14
every payment must involve a cost because income and cost are the two sides of the 
same economic reality, namely, of an exchange transaction. When it comes to rent, this 
erroneous principle implies that rent must be a cost because it involves an income, a 
payment, and, therefore, it must represent the cost of some factor. According to this 
idea, Varian says that rent is the payment for the services that the landowner or the 
license-issuer make to production by accepting to sell the permission to use their 
factors. However, Varian comes back to Ricardo and writes: 
“Efforts directed at keeping or acquiring claims to factors in fixed supplies are sometimes 
referred to as rent seeking. From the viewpoint of society they represent a pure deadweight loss since 
they don’t create any more output, they just change the market value of existing factors of production.” 
(Varian, 1993, 392) 
Rent does not correspond to any contribution to output, which means that it is 
not the equivalent of any productive service contributed to production by any 
productive factor. Economic rents involve a deadweight loss for society, that is, for the 
economy as a whole, because they are originated by monopoly. By “changing the 
market value of the existing factors of production”, rent implies a transfer of already 
existing value to some monopolists from the rest of the economy. Accordingly, if 
somebody gets a rent it is not because of the productivity of what he “supplies” to the 
economy, but because of a monopoly he has. 
2. Rent and Producer’s Surplus 
We have just seen how Varian links rent to producers’ surplus. This is 
interesting as it provides another instance to see the contradictory ideas about surplus 
vale, profit and rent that plague standard Microeconomics. We are going to see that 
Varian says, on the one hand, that the producer’s surplus is not a cost, but, on the other 
hand, that it is a cost. 
“Recall our discussion of producer’s surplus in chapter 14. We defined producer’s surplus to 
be the area to the left of the supply curve, in analogy to consumer’s surplus, which was the area to the left 
of the demand curve. It turns out that producer’s surplus is closely related to the profits of a firm. More 
precisely, producer’s surplus is equal to revenues minus variable costs, or equivalently, profits plus the 
fixed costs.” (Varian, 1993, 370) 
It is strange to see profits and fixed costs together in the same box of surplus: 
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How is it possible for fixed cost, being a cost, to be part of the surplus that accrues to 
the producers? A cost that is a surplus? A surplus a part of which is a cost? This seems 
to defy all economic logic. It is the more strange when we see that variable cost is 
excluded from producer’s surplus. 
Since profit of any kind must be zero in the competitive equilibrium, it follows 
that, under competitive equilibrium, total revenue must be equal to fixed plus variable 
costs. This means that, under competitive conditions, the whole producer’s surplus 
consists in fixed cost, that is, in cost, which reveals the contradiction in a stronger way. 
“Producer’s surplus is equal to revenues minus variable costs, or equivalently, profits plus the 
fixed costs: 
profits = py – cv(y) – F 
producer’s surplus = py - cv(y)”. (Varian, 1993, 370) 
In Ricardo, rent, being diverted extraordinary profit, is not a cost of 
production, but the share of the property of land in surplus value. Ricardo’s idea is still 
alive in Varian, but, as is standard in current Microeconomics, it is inconsistently mixed 
up with its contrary. According to the first, rent is not a production cost, but the excess 
of revenue over total production cost, including opportunity costs. This first view is 
akin to that of Ricardo’s. But, according to Varian’s second view, rent is the 
opportunity cost of fixed factors, which means that rent is a production cost. The 
principle underlying this second view is that the value of output cannot be different 
from the value of input and, accordingly, revenue can never be greater than cost. This 
implies that what appears to be surplus is actually no surplus, but a production cost. 
In Ricardo, producers’ surplus would be the temporary advantage, that is, the 
temporary higher profit enjoyed by the firms or industries with special facilities of 
production. As he correctly explains, competition tends continuously to do away with 
these differences and to produce a uniform profit rate. 
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